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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78-2-2 and UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial Court erred in striking Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Determinative law: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 5 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7 
Cowley v. Porter, 127 P.3d 1224 (Utah 2005). 
Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976). 
Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155 (Utah 2004). 
Standard of review: 
The issue of whether the Court properly struck the Defendants' motion as untimely 
is a matter of law. When reviewing an issue of law the Appellant Court accords the Trial 
Court's legal conclusions no deference and reviews them for correctness. 
Nova Casualty Company v. Able Construction, Inc., 983 P 2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
The issue of whether the Court properly struck the Defendants' Memorandum if untimely 
relates to the Court's case management authority. Such authority will only be reversed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.Co„ Inc., 830 P.2d 291 
(Utah App. 1992). 
I. Whether the trial Court erred in holding the agreement between the parties, sued on by the 
Plaintiff, was a valid enforceable contract. 
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Determinative law: 
Aquagen International, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411 (Utah 1999). 
Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity and Guarantees Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 
211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965). 
Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982). 
Standard of review: 
The Appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. In so doing, the 
Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Shaw Res. Ltd., LLC v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 142 P.3d 560 (Utah App. 2006). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Copies of all determinative constitution provisions, statutes and rules are attached hereto as 
Addendum "B". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated by the Plaintiff with the filing of a Complaint on or about January 9, 
2008. R. 1. The named Defendants were Advantage Title Company and Shawn D. Turner. Plaintiff 
alleged four causes of action 1) Breach of Contract 2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing 3) Specific Performance and 4) unjust enrichment. R.l. Defendants filed an answer 
denying the claims for relief on the basis that the Agreement was not enforceable due to a lack of 
consideration. R.12. 
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On or about February 20, 2008 the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. R.17. On 
March 10, 2008 Defendants filed their response by mail. R.42. The response was docketed by the 
Court on March 11, 2008. On March 11,2008, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Decision 
alleging no responsive pleading had been filed. R. 50. 
On March 18, 2008 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the Defendants responsive pleading. 
R.53. A response to the motion was filed by hand delivering a copy to the Court, where it was placed 
in the filing basket in the Clerk's office, and by mailing a copy to the Plaintiffs counsel on April 4, 
2008. R.154. The Court apparently lost the filed pleading. A notice to Submit for Decision, alleging 
no response had been made, was filed by the Plaintiff on April 9, 2008. R.66 
On April 16, 2008, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order on the 
Summary Judgment Motion and Motion to Strike, granting the Motions. R.69. The final Order was 
entered on May 15, 2008 and this Appeal was filed June 12,2008. R.157, R.178. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
: 1. • In 2004, Plaintiff and Defendant Advantage Title Company entered into a 
verbal agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to transfer a condominium she owned, 
located in Park City, Utah, to Advantage in return for Advantage's promises to cure 
arrearages owed by the plaintiff on a note secured by a trust deed on the property and 
to make further payments on the note until the note was paid off. R.69-70. 
2. Plaintiff transferred the property to Advantage and Advantage cured the 
arrearages and made all payments on the note through April of 2008. R.46-47, R.70. 
3. In 2007, plaintiff had become frustrated by the failure of Advantage Title 
Company to finish paying the note in full, releasing plaintiff from potential liability, 
and thereby improving her credit so she could pursue other financial opportunities. 
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R.46-47. 
Plaintiff hired an attorney who entered into negotiations with Advantage Title 
Company in an attempt to get the concerns of the plaintiff resolved. R.47. 
These discussions led to the creation of an Agreement between the parties on 
August 15, 2007 (the "Agreement5"). R.31, R.47 
The Agreement specifically states that it has an effective date of August 15, 
2007. R.31. 
The Agreement required Advantage Title to pay the underlying note in full 
by October 1,2007. R.31. 
The Agreement provided that in the event the loan was not paid by 10/1/07, 
Advantage Title would pay to the Plaintiff a penalty of $1,000.00. The Agreement 
fiirther provided that there would be a $1,000.00 per monlh penalty for each month 
thereafter, if the note was not paid. The Agreement provided that final payoff was to 
be no later than 12/31/07. R.31. 
It is undisputed that none of the penalty provisions or the dead lines for 
paying the note off were included in the original Agreement of 2004. R.69-70. 
The Agreement provided that Shawn D. Turner was to be the personal 
guarantor of Advantage Title's obligations under the Agreement. R.32. 
Shawn D. Turner was not a personal guarantor under the terms of the original 
2004 agreement. R.70. 
Advantage Title was unable to pay the note in full before 12/31/07. R.20. 
On or about 1/9/08 Plaintiff filed here complaint in this matter. R.l. 
Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint. R.12. 
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15. On or about February 20, 2008 plaintiff mailed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment to the defendants. R32. 
16. Pursuant to Rule 6 of th4e Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a response was due 
March 10, 2008. R.71. 
17. A response was filed by mail on March 10,2008, the opposition was 
docketed on March 11,2008. R.47 
18. On March 11,2008 a notice to submit for decision was filed by the plaintiff, 
indicating that no responsive pleading was filed. R.50. 
19. On March 18,2008 Plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendants' opposition to 
the motion for summary judgment. R.53. 
20. On April 4, 2008 a response to the motion to strike was filed in the Court by 
hand delivering the opposition memo to the clerk's office where it was placed in the 
filing basket. R.161, R.164. 
21. On or about April 11, 2008 Plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on 
her motion to strike. It again alleged no responsive pleading had been filed. R. 66. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There are only two issues in this case. The first is a procedural issue and the second a legal 
issue. The initial procedural issue is whether the trial court was correct in striking the defendants' 
opposition memorandum to the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. The defendants' 
opposition memorandum was due on March 10, 2008. It was completed on that date and mailed to 
the Plaintiff. It was not however docketed until the following day at the Court. Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure governs "SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER 
PAPERS". The rule requires service on the attorneys of all parties represented by counsel in the 
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mater. Rule 5(b)(1)(B) provides, in pertinent part, "Service by mail, email or fax is complete 
upon sending." Service in this matter was made on March 10, 2008 as required. Rule 5 goes on 
to state "All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the 
court either before or within a reasonable time after service." URCP Rule 5(d). The opposition 
memorandum was "filed" with the court one day after service. Clearly this meets the 
"reasonableness" test of Rule 5 and accordingly the Court's striking of the response was in error. 
The legal issue is again straight forward. The issue is whether the Agreement entered 
into by the parties in August of 2007 was an enforceable contract. The formation of a contract 
requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a 
consideration. Consideration sufficient to support the formation of a contract requires that a 
performance or a return promise must be bargained for. Aquagen International, Inc. v. Calrae 
Trust, 972 P.2d. 411,413 (Utah 1999). 
The undisputed facts are that a verbal contract was entered into between the Plaintiff and 
Advantage Title Company in 2004. The contract required the plaintiff to transfer a 
condominium in Park City to Advantage and for Advantage to cure arrearages on the plaintiffs 
loan and to make the payments on the loan thereafter. The property was transferred, the 
arrearage was satisfied and Advantage made the payments on the mortgage through April of 
2008/ 
A written Agreement was entered in August of 2007 between the original parties to the 
2004 contract and Shawn D. Turner. The Agreement stated it was effective 8/15/07. It was 
executed at the end of August 2007. It required Advantage to pay the loan by the end of September 
2007. It required Advantage to pay Barbee up to $1,000.00 for attorney fees for negotiating the 
1
 The loan was paid in full in July 2008. 
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Agreement. It required Advantage to pay penalties of $1,000.00 per month if the loan was not paid in 
full by September 30, 2008. It required Shawn Turner to guaranty Advantage's performance under 
the Agreement. As consideration for all of these items, which were not included in the contract of 
2004, the Plaintiff gave nothing. The sole recited consideration was the transfer of the property to 
Advantage, but that transfer had already taken place three years previously in return for the promises 
Advantage made at that time. Because it is undisputed that there was not any consideration for the 
promises of Advantage or Turner in the 2007 Agreement, the Agreement consists solely of gratuitous 
promises and it is not an enforceable contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STRICKEN DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION. 
A. Defendants' Filing Was Timely. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires an opposition memorandum to be 
filed within ten days after service of the Motion and accompanying Memorandum. Rule 6 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that for purposes of computing the time to respond you 
do not include intervening weekends or holidays and at the end of the period, you add three days 
for mailing. If that final day falls on a weekend or holiday, the date for compliance is the nest 
business day. 
The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was allegedly filed on February 20, 2008. 
Calculating the time for a response from the February 20, 2008 date the response was due on 
March 10,2008. The defendants' opposition memorandum was served on March 10,2008. 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs "SERVICE AND FILING OF 
PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS". The rule requires service on the attorneys of all parties 
represented by counsel in the matter. Rule 5(b)(1)(B) provides, in pertinent part, "Service by 
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mail, email or fax is complete upon sending." Service in this matter was made on March 10, 
2008 as required. Rule 5 goes on to state "All papers after the complaint required to be served 
upon a party shall be filed with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service." 
URCP Rule 5(d). 
The Plaintiff states the Opposition was filed on March 11,2008. Clearly one day is 
within the Rules stricture of reasonableness. See e.g. Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah 
1976) (A motion which "was filed within two days after service comports with the reasonable time 
requirement of Rule 5(d), U.R.C.P.") 
B. Striking Defendants' Opposition Was An Abuse Of Discretion. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in managing cases assigned to Iheir courts and appellate 
courts will not interfere with a trial court's case management unless its actions amount to an abuse of 
discretion. Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., Inc, 830 P,2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992). 
Striking the defendants' opposition constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed an attitude of disfavor towards summary judgment as 
a whole. Because a summary judgment prevents litigants from fully presenting their case to the court, 
courts are, and should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy. Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 
Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960). This problem is heightened in this case through the trial court's 
use of the Rules of Civil Procedure to deny defendants an opportunity to respond to the motion. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, stated the purpose of the rules as follows: "The fundamental 
purpose of these rules is to liberalize both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are 
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their 
dispute." Cowley v. Porter, 127 P.3d 1224, 1231 (Utah App. 2005). 
In the instant case service was made on the Plaintiff as required by the rules. There was no 
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prejudice to the Plaintiff, in any fashion, from the one day delay in docketing the opposition. The 
trial court's decision to strike the opposition only exacerbates the reason that summary judgment is 
disfavored as a whole and defeats the purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure which are to give the 
parties the privilege of presenting their legitimate contentions. 
Striking the defendants pleading results in serious prejudice to them, while allowing the 
pleading would not have impacted the court's ability to manage its calendar or have resulted in any 
prejudice to the plaintiff. Striking the opposition accordingly constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
H. THE "AGREEMENT" IS NOT AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. 
A. PLAINTIFF GAVE NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE "AGREEMENT". 
The undisputed facts are that a verbal contract was entered into between the Plaintiff and 
Advantage Title Company in 2004. The contract required the plaintiff to transfer a 
condominium in Park City to Advantage and for Advantage to cure arrearages on the plaintiffs 
loan and to make the payments on the loan thereafter. The property was transferred, the 
arrearage was satisfied and Advantage made the payments on the mortgage through April of 
2008. 
A written Agreement was entered in August of 2007 between the original parties to the 
2004 contract and Shawn D. Turner. The Agreement stated it was effective 8/15/07. It was 
executed at the end of August 2007. It required Advantage to pay the loan by the end of September 
2007. It required Advantage to pay Barbee up to $1,000.00 for attorney fees for negotiating the 
Agreement. It required Advantage to pay penalties of $1,000.00 per month if the loan was not paid in 
full by September 30,2008. It required Shawn Turner to guaranty Advantage's performance under 
the Agreement. As consideration for all of these items, which were not included in the contract of 
2004, the Plaintiff gave nothing. The sole recited consideration was the transfer of the property to 
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Advantage, but that transfer had already taken place three years previously in return for the promises 
Advantage made at that time. Because it is undisputed that there was not any consideration for the 
promises of Advantage or Turner in the 2007 Agreement, the Agreement consists solely of gratuitous 
promises and it is not an enforceable contract. 
B. Issues of Material Fact Precluded An Award of Summary Judgment. 
Summary Judgment is only available where there are no disputed issues of material fact and 
the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Snyder v. 
Merkley, 693 P 2d. 64 (1984). Only where it clearly appears that the party against whom the 
judgment would be granted can't possible establish a right to recover should summary judgment be 
granted, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of such a party when summary judgment against 
him is being considered. Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance 
Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d. 211, 398 P 2d. 685 (1965). In considering a motion, the court must 
"view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 Utah 2004). It only takes one 
sworn statement to dispute averments on the other side of a controversy and create an issue of 
fact, precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P 2d. 191 (1975). Where 
the party making the motion does not support his or her motion with competent sworn testimony 
or other admissible evidence, the party opposing the motion is entitled to rely on his 
contradictory pleadings. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). 
The Plaintiffs Complaint and the Court's Memorandum decision make it clear that no 
consideration was given for the 2007 "Agreement". The Court skirts this issue by declaring that 
the 2007 Agreement is simply a memorialization of the 2004 Agreement. In its Memorandum 
Decision the court states: 
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The sole argument presented by the Defendants in opposing the motion is that the Agreement is 
unenforceable for lack of consideration. They note that the Plaintiff has only identified the 
transfer of the Property as consideration for the Agreement. They argue, however that the 
transfer "occurred in 2004 and was in return for Advantage's promises to make the mortgage 
payment (which Plaintiff, in the Agreement, admits had been made through August of 2007)." 
(Memo in Opposition, at 2). In other words, the Defendants appear to contend that the 2007 
Agreement is separate from the 2004 exchange. 
The Plaintiff counters that the 2007 Agreement is merely a memorialization of the contract 
entered into in 2004. The Court agrees. Nothing in the Agreement suggests that it represents a 
new obligation. 
R.72-73. 
In its ruling the Court has explicitly violated the strictures of Rule 56. Instead of viewing the 
facts and their inferences in the light most favorable to the Defendants, it has instead created 
inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. The Court recognized that Defendants claim 
the 2007 Agreement and the 2004 contract are separate, but accepts the assertion of the Plaintiff that 
the 2007 Agreement is just a memorialization. A simple examination of the facts shows the Court's 
interpretation is in error. 
The Agreement itself states that it is "effective as of August 15, 2007". The 2007 Agreement 
includes Shawn Turner as a party whereas the 2004 contract did not. The allegations of the 
Complaint state "10. On or about August 31, 2007, Barbee entered into an agreement with 
Advantage Title and Turner (the "Agreement")." There is nothing in the affidavit of the Plaintiff 
submitted with her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for summary judgment that states the 
2007 Agreement was simply a memorialization. In short the Court has taken the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff and not the Defendant. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling is in error 
and must be reversed. 
I I 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's Opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion was timely or in the 
alternative the defect was of such negligible magnitude that the trial court's striking of the opposition 
constituted an abuse of discretion. In either event the opposition should be allowed. 
Whether the opposition is allowed or not, the plaintiff failed to provide sworn testimony 
rebutting the presumption made in defendants' Answer that the 2007 Agreement was unenforceable 
due to a lack of consideration. The trial court's acceptance of the plaintiffs position that the 2007 
Agreement is simply a memorialization of the prior 2004 Contract is directly contrary to the evidence 
and certainly was not made interpreting the evidence in the favor of the party fighting the motion. If 
the issue cannot be decided in the defendants' favor, as a matter of law, it at least results in the 
creation of an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2008 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON 
Shawn D. Turner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of October, 2008 a true and correct copy of Brief of 
Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David P. Hirschi 
Jeffrey J. Steele 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Ste. 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Prepared by: 
David P. Hirschi, Esq. (1502) 
Jeffrey J. Steele, Esq. (10606) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIFFANI BARBEE-DEAN, an individual. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADVANTAGE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; and SHAWN TURNER, an 
individual 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AGAINST 
ADVANTAGE TITLE COMPANY AND 
SHAWN D. TURNER 
Case No.: 080900499 
Judge Toomey 
THE COURT having granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and having 
entered a Memorandum Decision and Order thereon, now enters this Judgment against 
Defendant Advantage Title Company and Defendant Shawn D. Turner. 
/// 
/// 
/// i nnin mn ini KM IKH iffil IMI flHI HI (HH ill {IB 
JD26591273 P»9««: 
080900499 AOVANf AGE TITLE COMPANY 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff Tiffani Barbee-Dean is hereby awarded damages against Defendant 
Advantage Title Company and Defendant Shawn D. Turner, jointly and severally, in the amount 
of One Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Six Dollars and 79/100 
($127,126.79), which is the payoff amount for the Citimortgage loan as of April 29,2008, with 
interest accruing thereon at the statutory post-judgment interest rate until paid in full. 
2. Plaintiff Tiffani Barbee-Dean is also awarded damages against Defendant 
Advantage Title and Defendant Shawn D„ Turner, jointly and severally, in the amount of Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), as and for damages under the Agreement, comprised of $1,000.00 
for each of the previous months of December, January, February, March and April, with interest 
accruing thereon at the statutory post-judgment interest rate until paid in full. 
3. Plaintiff Tiffani Barbee-Dean is also awarded damages against Defendant 
Advantage Title and Defendant Shawn D. Turner, jointly and severally, in the amount of Five 
Thousand Forty-Eight Dollars and 15/100 ($5,048.15), as and for attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this matter, with interest accruing thereon at the statutory post-judgment interest rate 
until paid in full. 
4. Plaintiff Tiffani Barbee-Dean is also awarded damages against Defendant 
Advantage Title and Defendant Shawn D. Turner, jointly and severally, for all attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred in collecting this Judgment against Defendants, as shall be established by 
subsequent affidavit. 
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DATED this of May 2008. 
BY THE 
Wa 
Judge Kate A. Tddrneyi;-**/^  
Third Judicial^i 's^rS*'^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2008.1 caused to be mailed by first class 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AGAINST 
ADVANTAGE TITLE COMPANY AND SAWN D. TURNER to: 
Shawn D. Turner 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Ste. B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Attorneys for Defendants 
An employee of HIRSCHI CHRJSTENSEN, PLLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIFFANI BARBEE-DEAN, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
CASE NO. 080900499 
vs. : 
ADVANTAGE TITLE CO. : 
and SHAWN TURNER, 
Defendants. 
The Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike the 
Defendants' opposition memorandum, which were submitted for decision on March 12, 
2008 and April 11, 2008, respectively. The parties did not request a hearing. Having 
considered the arguments presented, the Court enters the following Memorandum 
Decision and Order: 
BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case are undisputed.1 The Plaintiff held ownership interest in real 
estate in Park City, Utah (the "Property"), which was secured by a mortgage from 
Citimortgage. She transferred the Property to Defendant Advantage Title Company at the 
1
 Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A), each of the Plaintiff's facts which are not 
specifically controverted by the Defendants' opposition are deemed admitted. Although 
the Defendants disputed Plaintiff's Statement of Fact #5, they did not do so using 
evidence, as required by Rule 56(e). Nevertheless, the Plaintiff contends that the 
Defendants' version of that fact does not differ substantially from her own. As such, the 
Court will assume the truth of the Defendants' recitation of Fact #5. 
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end of 2004 in return for a promise by Advantage to bring the mortgage current, to pay past 
due HOA fees, to protect the Plaintiff from further deficiencies relating to the property, and 
to take responsibility for all payments under the mortgage. The payoff amount for the 
Citimortgage loan was $128,778.24, and payoff was valid through March 1, 2008. The 
Defendants made the mortgage payments through August 2007. 
On August 31,2007, the parties executed an agreement (the "Agreement") reciting 
the terms of the 2004 exchange. Defendant Shawn Turner personally guaranteed 
Advantage Title's responsibilities under the Agreement. Under the terms of the 
Agreement, the Defendants agreed to completely pay the Citimortgage loan by December 
31,2007. They have failed to do so. They also agreed to pay the Plaintiff $1,000 if they 
had not completed their obligations within forty-seven days of execution, and $1,000 for 
every thirty days that passed thereafter until they paid the loan in full. The Defendants 
made the first three $1,000 payments, but have since stopped paying. The Agreement 
provides for the recovery of attorney fees. 
The Plaintiff brought suit, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, specific performance, and unjust enrichment. The Plaintiff 
served her motion upon the Defendants on February 20,2008. The Defendants filed their 
opposition memorandum on March 11, 2008. 
DISCUSSION 
The Plaintiff asks the Court to strike the Defendants' memorandum in opposition 
and to enter summary judgment on her claim for breach of contract. The Court will 
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address each argument in turn. 
A. Motion to Strike Opposition Memorandum 
The Plaintiff asks the Court to strike the Defendants' opposition memorandum for 
untimeliness and failure to comply with Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 
7, a party must file an opposition within ten days of service. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). This 
calculation excludes weekends and holidays. Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a). The Defendants were 
also given an additional three days for mailing, which include weekends and holidays 
unless the final day falls upon a weekend or holiday. Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e). 
The Plaintiff served her motion upon the Defendants by mail on Wednesday, 
February 20, 2008. The ten days provided by Rule 7 expired on March 5,2008, and the 
mailing period extended the deadline for filing to March 10, 2008. The Defendants filed 
their opposition on March 11, 2008. The Court retains discretion to strike untimely 
pleadings. See e.g., Treffv. Turner, 1999 UT App 23 (unpublished decision). 
The Defendants have not opposed the motion to strike or offered any reason the 
opposition could not have been timely filed. The Court grants the motion as well-taken and 
unopposed. 
B. Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on each of her claims. Given that the 
Court has stricken the Defendants' opposition memorandum, summary judgment may be 
properly entered as unopposed. Even if the Court were to consider the Defendants' 
opposition, however, the Plaintiff would still be entitled to summary judgment on her claim 
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for breach of contract. 
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the "pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering a motion, the Court 
must "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, H3,104 P.3d 
1208. This case requires the Court to interpret a contract. "'If the language within the four 
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter 
of law.'" Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. v. York, 2007 UT App 265, H 9,167 P.3d 
523 (citation omitted). 
The Plaintiff has produced an Agreement, executed by the Defendants, in which 
they recognize that the Plaintiff conveyed the Property to them in consideration of their 
promises. They have not fulfilled their obligations under the Agreement, injuring the 
Plaintiff. Thus, absent some reason the Agreement is unenforceable, the Plaintiff is 
entitled to summary judgment on her claim for breach of contract. 
The sole argument presented by the Defendants in opposing the motion is that the 
Agreement is unenforceable for lack of consideration. They note that the Plaintiff has only 
identified the transfer of the Property as consideration for the Agreement. They argue, 
however, that the transfer "occurred in 2004 and was in return for Advantage's promises 
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to make the mortgage payment (which Plaintiff, in the Agreement, admits had been made 
through August of 2007)." (Memo in Opposition, at 2). In other words, the Defendants 
appear to contend that the 2007 Agreement is separate from the 2004 exchange. 
The Plaintiff counters that the 2007 Agreement is merely a memorialization of the 
contract entered into in 2004. The Court agrees. Nothing in the Agreement suggests that 
it represents a new obligation. It identifies the Property which the Plaintiff conveyed to the 
Defendants in 2004. It recognizes that the Defendants accepted, at the time of 
acceptance, an obligation to make the mortgage payments, and indicated that the 
Defendants had met its obligations to the date of the Agreement's execution. Because the 
parties' intent is easily gleaned from the unambiguous language of the Agreement, the 
Court determines the parties' intent as a matter of law. 
A party should be permitted to accomplish performance prior to written 
memorialization without fear that the other party will claim a lack of consideration. Indeed, 
even under the Defendants' interpretation of the evidence, the Defendants would still be 
responsible for the mortgage payments. And to the extent the Defendants argue that the 
Agreement unfairly imposes new terms into their agreement, this argument would avail 
them nothing. "Even though a binding contract is made before a contemplated written 
memorial is prepared and adopted," the memorialization of the contract "may make a 
binding modification of the terms previously agreed to." Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 27 cmt d (1981). 
In addition, the Defendants offer no evidence to support their theory that the 2007 
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Agreement is independent of the 2004 exchange.2 There is no genuine dispute of material 
fact regarding whether the 2007 Agreement was a belated memorialization of the 2004 
exchange. In consideration of the Defendants' promises, the Plaintiff transferred her 
ownership interest in the Property to the Defendants. This is sufficient to establish 
consideration. See Healthcare Services Group v. Utah Department of Health, 2002 UT 5, 
U 17, 40 P.3d 591 ("'[T]here is consideration whenever a promisor receives a benefit or 
where [a] promisor suffers a detriment, however slight.'") (citation omitted); see also 
Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Commission, 553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1976) ("If one 
party asks for and receives something which he would not otherwise be entitled to from the 
other, that is adequate consideration."). Property ownership represents a valuable asset, 
even if the Defendants were obligated to make mortgage payments. And the Defendants 
had no legal right to the Property outside of the Agreement. Thus, the Plaintiff suffered a 
detriment by transferring ownership in the Property to the Defendants. 
The Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is no genuine dispute of material fact with 
respect to her claim for breach of contract. As such, summary judgment is appropriate.3 
She has requested the Court to order specific performance. However, the Defendants 
2
 In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
3
 Because the Plaintiff has prevailed on her claim for breach of contract, the 
Court need not consider her claims for unjust enrichment and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which were alternate theories of recovery. 
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have already demonstrated their inability to meet their contractual obligations. They have 
insisted that they always intended to make the payments, but have been unable to do so 
due to certain programs being cancelled. The Court doubts that a court order will increase 
the Defendants' ability to meet their obligations. Instead, the Court will enter a judgment 
in the amount due on the mortgage and the amounts recoverable under the Agreement, 
including the Plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
ORDER 
The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff's motion to strike the Defendants' opposition 
memorandum and GRANTS the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on her claim for 
breach of contract. 
The Plaintiff shall prepare a judgment reflecting the amount of recovery, as well as 
an affidavit supporting her request for attorney's fees. See Utah R. Civ. P. 73. 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers, 
(a) Service: When required. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court, 
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading 
subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery/ every written 
motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, 
demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the 
parties. 
(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court; 
(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served 
with all pleadings and papers; 
(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing 
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting 
party; 
(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of judgment 
under Rule 58A(d); and . 
(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default 
for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in 
Rule 4. 
(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, in which no person is named as 
defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or 
appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the 
property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) If a party is represented by an attorney service shall be made upon the attorney 
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. If an attorney has filed a 
Notice of Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate to a 
matter within the scope of the Notice, service shall be made upon the attorney and 
the party. 
(A) If a hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, the party shall 
use the method most likely to give prompt actual notice of the hearing. Otherwise, a 
party shall serve a paper under this rule: 
(i) upon any person with an electronic filing account who is a party or attorney in the 
case by submitting the paper for electronic filing: 
(ii) by sending it by email to the person's last known email address if that person has 
agreed to accept service by email; 
(iii) by faxing it to the person's last known fax number if that person has agreed to 
accept service by fax; 
(iv) by mailing it to the personfs last known address; 
(v) by handing it to the person; 
(vi) by leaving it at the person's office with a person in charge or leaving it in a 
receptacle intended for receiving deliveries or in a conspicuous place; or. 
(vii) by leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with a 
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. 
(B) Service by mail, email or fax is complete upon sending. Service by electronic 
means is not effective if the party making service learns that the attempted service 
did not reach the person to be served. 
(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a 
judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served 
by the party preparing it; and . 
(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. 
In any action in which there is an unusually large number of defendants, the court, 
upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the 
defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and 
that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all 
other parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the 
plaintiff constitutes notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall be 
served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. 
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with 
the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service 
completed by the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers 
related to discovery. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. 
A party may file with the clerk of court using any means of delivery permitted by the 
court. The court may require parties to file electronically with an electronic filing 
account. Filing is complete upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic filing 
system, the clerk of court or the judge. The filing date shall be noted on the paper. 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. 
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local 
rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of 
the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run 
shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, 
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs 
until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
When the period of time prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional 
time provided under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court an act 
is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause 
shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order 
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period 
originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made 
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the 
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for 
taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to 
the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. 
The period of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding 
is not affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. 
The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power 
of a court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action that has been 
pending before it. 
(d) Notice of hearings. 
Notice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for 
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. 
Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. 
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some 
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper 
upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added 
to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under subsection (a). Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3-day period 
under this subsection, except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of the next day that is 
not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to 
commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. 
There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to a 
cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person 
who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a 
third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be 
allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party 
answer. 
(b) (1) Motions. -
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during 
a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in 
accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with 
particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. 
(2) Limit on order to show cause. 
An application to the court for an order to show cause shall be made only for 
enforcement of an exiting order or for sanctions for violating an existing order. An 
application for an order to show cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to 
show cause to believe a party has violated a court order. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. 
All motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a 
supporting memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition. 
Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party 
may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in 
the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without 
leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(2) Length. 
Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of the court. 
Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court. 
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte 
application and a showing of good cause. 
(3) Content. 
(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue 
exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation 
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in 
the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless controverted by the responding party. 
(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and 
may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the 
moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an 
explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth 
in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered 
and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of 
contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of 
documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. 
When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." 
The request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the motion was 
served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply 
memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no 
party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. 
The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing in the 
motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for 
hearing shall be separately identified in the caption of the document containing the 
request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a 
motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless 
the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue 
has been authoritatively decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered 
in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be 
enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided 
by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated 
or modified by the judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state 
whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, 
within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed 
order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall 
be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to 
object. 
(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate 
documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. 
A recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by 
the court. A party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the 
same manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in 
open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, ten 
days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may respond 
to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
